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I. INTRODUCTION

Lawyers have argued about interpreting statutes as long as legislatures have
enacted them and the Internal Revenue Code is not immune from these debates.
When interpreting the Code, some approach the tax statutes narrowly, insisting on
strict construction. 1 For others, Code sections have less literal meanings that can be
discovered through a series of interpretive tools. 2
Some of these interpretive devices, such as legislative history and administrative
regulations, appear frequently in federal tax controversies. 3 These methods depend
upon material external to the statute-what Congress "thought" when it enacted a
statute or how the Treasury Department interpreted a law. 4 These tools also are
neutral, because they are used to justify decisions in which both litigants-the
government or the taxpayer--have won (but not at the same time on the same
issue ). 5

1

See genera!/y John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax
Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (1997); Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and
Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 772 ( 1997) (noting the Supreme Court's increasing
reliance on ''plain meaning" of statute when deciding tax cases). See also Joseph !senbergh,
Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 859 (1982) (arguing against
risks of non-literal interpretations).
2

Rationalizing statutory interpretation is beyond the scope of this Article, but has a rich
history and is implicit in any argument for wandering beyond the boundaries of a statute. For
a recent, concise assessment about statutory interpretation, see generally William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Book Review: No Frills Textualism, 119 H<\RV. L. REV. 2041 (2006). For two excellent
empirical studies of methods of interpretation used by the Supreme Court, see James J.
Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral
Reasoning, 58 V AND. L. REv. I (2005) (labor law); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes:
lntoprelive Regime.\. 38 LOYOLA LA. L. REV. 1909 (2005) (tax law).

lSee generally Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism," and the
Interprelalion ofTax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REv. 677, Part II.B ( 1996) (arguing that tax is not an
area oflaw subject to special rules of interpretation).
4
See generally Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax
Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343 (1991) (reviewing regulations in tax area); Bernard Wolfman,
Note, Supreme Court Decisions in Ta.mtion: 1980 Term, 35 TAX LAW. 443 (1982) (reviewing
the use of regulations by Supreme Court); Beverly I. Moran & Daniel M. Schneider, The
Elephant and the Four Blind Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal Ta.'< Decisions, 39 How.
L.J. S41, 907-27 (1996) (reviewing the Burger Court's federal tax decisions and notes its

reliance on regulations in its tax decisions).
5

For examples of decisions about legislative history, compare National Mufflers Dealers
Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 484 ( 1979) (affording "serious deference" to
regulation in light of legislative history; taxpayer lost) with Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S.
206, 220 ( 1984) (allowing taxpayer a depletion deduction by "measur[ing] against the
legislative process by which" the relevant law was enacted). Regarding regulations, compare
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Another common method of interpreting the Code is through "judicial doctrines,"
as might occur, for example, when a court determines that a corporate transformation
does not qualify as a ''reorganization" under Code § 368 and, therefore, docs not
enjoy the attendant tax benefits, because it lacks a "business purpose." 6 The
common wisdom about these judicial doctrines is that they are used only to justify
decisions in favor of the government. They are not neutral because they cannot be
used to rationalize decisions on behalf of the taxpayer. And, unlike the methods of
construction just noted, they do not explicitly reach beyond the words of a statute,
even if they set aside the effect of those words. 7
The source for judicial doctrines used in federal tax controversies is Gregory v.
Helvering. 8 Evelyn Gregory tried to do what taxpayers always try to do-reduce her
tax bill. Gregory owned a corporation, United Mortgage, which in turn owned stock
of Monitor. Gregory wanted to own the Monitor stock directly but, if United
Mortgage had simply distributed the stock to her as a dividend in order to give her
possession of the stock-the most obvious route--she would have been taxed on the
full amount of the distribution at a high rate of tax. Therefore, Gregory had United
Mortgage engage in a "reorganization,'' the terminus of which still was her
ownership of the Monitor stock. By engaging in this reorganization, Gregory
believed that she could expose a smaller portion of the distribution to tax and incur
tax at a lower rate."
National Muftlers Dealers Association v. United States. (upholding regulation and government
won) with Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394
( 1972) (finding reallocation of income required under regulation. but taxpayer won on facts or
the case).
6

See. e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 ( 1935).

7

Another method of interpretation, textualism, also looks only to the statute. See generalII·
Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Pwpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492.
497. 502 ( 1995); Moran & Schneider, supra note 4. at 928-42.
For a far-ranging article about interpreting the Code, see Staudt et al., supra note 2
(empirical research about Supreme Court tax decisions).
See also Daniel M. Schneider,
Statutory Construction in Federal Appellate Tax Cases: The Effect of Judges' Sucial
Backgrounds and of Other Aspects of" Litigation, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 257 (2003)
(hereinalter, Schneider, Statutory] (statutory construction in appellate decisions about federal
tax); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research About Judicial Reasoning: Statut01y
Interpretation in Federal Tux Cases, 31 N. M. L. Rev. 325 (200 1) (hereinafter Schneider,
Empirica[j (statutory construdion in trial decisions about federal tax).
While interpreting statutes may raise questions about the institutional bias of the method
used, textualism suggests a dcterence to the legislature or reliance on administrative
pronouncements, and reveals a bias towards the executive branch, but that discussion is
beyond the scope of this article. Judges disregarding statutes' language, as they do when
applying judicial doctrines, reveals a tilt towards the judiciary. For an excellent discussion
about institutional biases, with an eye towards tax, see Staudt et al., supra note 2.
x293 U.S. 465 ( 1935). While GregO!)" is considered a seminal case, judicial doctrines
were used even bef\)re Gregor\'. See infi·a note 39 (notes pre-Gregorr authority).
·>Gregory had United Mortgage engage in a reorganization by placing some of its assets-the Monitor stock-into another corporation, Averill, created solely to facilitate the transfer of
Monitor stock to her. Revenue Act of 1928 § 112(i), 45 Stat. 798. The Averill stock was
distributed by United Mortgage to Gregory, and she took the position that she should not be
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Gregory's place in the development of judicial doctrines is secured because of
how the Supreme Court justified deciding that a reorganization had not taken place.
While Gregory had technically engaged in a reorganization, the Supreme Court
determined that the transaction exalted "artifice above reality" and lacked a
"business ... purpose." 10 Gregory therefore was taxed on what she had received
absent a reorganization, a dividend.
As the seminal case, Gregory both suggests and illustrates the accepted wisdom
about "judicial doctrines," that they are invariably used on behalf of the government
because taxpayers control the transactions and can therefore determine the mode of
taxation. Taxpayers, the reasoning goes, rely on statutes' literal terms in order to
secure predictable results. Because non-literal readings derived from judicially
created doctrines that work exclusively in the government's favor, only the
government or the court, when it intends to decide on behalf of the government,
would ever invoke a judicial doctrine. 11 But for a few, strictly circumscribed
situations in which taxpayers may assert doctrines (e.g., fraud, mistake), 12 judicial
tax doctrines exist to service the government.
The forms of judicial doctrines most commonly cited since Gregory are:
•
•
•
•
•

business purpose;
economic substance;
sham transaction;
step transaction; and
substance over form.

taxed on receipt of that stock because she had received it as part of a reorganization. !d. §
1 12(g). When she liquidated Averill a few days after the distribution of its stock to her and,
therefore. received its asset-the Monitor stock-taxation was then appropriate, but only on
the amount of her gain in the transaction (the value of the Monitor stock minus what she was
considered to have paid tor it (her "basis")) and at capital gains rates. These facts are set out
more fully in the Second Circuit decision which Gregory appealed to the Supreme Court.
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
Gregory's situation may be illustrated by assuming that a corporation alternatively makes
a $100 dividend distribution to its shareholder or exchanges $100 for an asset in which the
taxpayer's basis is $20 in a transaction that is not characterized as a dividend. The amount of
the dividend subject to tax is $100. while the amount of gain (presumably, capital gain)
subject to tax is $80. See I.R.C. §§ 30 I (b) (amount of dividend), I 001 (a) (gain realized and
recognized) (2000). Both dividends and capital gain are currently subject to a maximum tax
rate of titteen percent. but that does not lessen the benefit of characterizing the shareholder's
income as capital gain, because a smaller amount is subject to tax. See I.R.C. § I (h) (I)
(capital gains)- (II) (dividends) (2000). The fifteen percent tax on the $100 dividend is $15,
while the fifteen percent tax on the $80 capital gain is $12. Capital gains are frequently taxed
at lower rates than dividends, however, as when Gregory engaged in her "reorganization." See
genera//;- BORIS I. 811TKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
ANIJ GIFTS ~,1 46.2, 46.2.1 (3d ed. 2000). A lower tax rate enhances the benetit of a capital
gain.
1

°Cregorv. 293 U.S. at 469-70. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit, which
determined "the transactions were no part of the conduct of the business of either or both
companies; so viewed they were a sham." Gregorv, 69 F.2d at 811.
11

See infi·a note 80.

12

See inji·a Part II. E.
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They are labeled judicial doctrines, to state the obvious, because they were
devised by judges, unlike guidelines promulgated by an agency, such as regulations,
or that arose against the background of how the Code is enacted, as is legislative
history. As in Gregory. courts theoretically use these doctrines to refute the
consequences that flow from accepting a taxpayer's strict compliance with the terms
of a statute. Because, for example, the taxpayer does not possess a "business
purpose" for what she did or because the "economic substance" or the "substance as
opposed to the form" of the transaction is other than as the taxpayer intended, the
taxpayer is denied the benefit of the transaction for which she intends to qualify.
The hypothesis of this Article is that the accepted wisdom-that judicial
doctrines are raised exclusively by the government or the courts for the
government's benefit-is wrong. Instead, judicial doctrines are used in a much
richer manner by courts and by taxpayers, as well as the government, than the
"wisdom" would suggest. It is the first paper to question the accepted thought about
judicial doctrines and to do so using social science methodology. Starting at the end
and working forward, the evidence assembled for this Article from a group of trial
decisions about federal tax controversies establishes that, under the language of the
judges' opinions, taxpayers frequently raise judicial doctrines. Sometimes arguing
that the doctrines should be applied and sometimes arguing that they should not, 13
taxpayers often are able to prevail in their arguments. 14 In other words, the data
negate the accepted wisdom. The "sword" wielded by the government has a second
edge, perhaps not as sharp as the government's, but nevertheless honed by the
taxpayer for its use against the government.
Indeed, circumstances can be
predictably associated with the litigants prevailing in having judicial doctrines
applied for their benefit, most notably the taxpayer prevailing when the business
purpose or sham transaction doctrines are used. When a party raises a doctrine and
also when the party raising a doctrine wants the court to apply the doctrine on behalf
of a litigant, that litigant is likely to prevail in the doctrine's application.
What accounts for this discrepancy between perception and reality? There are
two answers to this question, one narrow and the other general. More specifically,
judicial tax doctrines' alleged bias towards the government is derived from numerous
articles and essays which, in turn, uniformly promote the common wisdom. 15 The
authors of these articles and essays base their views on specific cases or strings of
cases, not the entire universe of cases about judicial doctrines or even a broader
sampling of such cases. 16 Furthermore, the literature is grounded in legal reasoning,
a formalistic approach which may enable us to shape concepts efficiently, but at the
apparent cost of excluding cases invoking judicial doctrines that do not fit the model.
To draw from one of the judicial doctrines explained below, legal reasoning may
help clarify what constitutes a business purpose, 17 but it does so by examining
relatively few cases about the doctrine, not all of them, and so legal reasoning may
13

See inj"ra fig.2.

14

See infi·a note 114.

15

Sec inji·a Part II (discussing literature).

16

Doctrines, and not just individual cases, are occasionally analyzed, but few attempts
have been made to examine judicial doctrines broadly. See infra note 24.
17

See in{ra Part II.C.3.
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not offer an accurate picture of how the business purpose doctrine is used (and, in
fact, does not).
More broadly, the current literature about judicial doctrines underscores tax
scholarship's failure to inquire other than as it has always done, here by using
quantitative social science methodology. Were the literature that girds judicial tax
doctrines is simply accepted, one would not understand that taxpayers are
empowered to assert these doctrines, even when they cannot prove fraud or mistake.
The data assembled for this Article comes from a broad swatch of cases-all trial
decisions available on-line from a fourteen year period-and sifts for patterns among
those cases and the accompanying briefs. While much can be said about traditional
legal scholarship, this research adds to it by making clear that judicial doctrines are
used complexly by the government, taxpayers, and judges in ways not addressed by
the authors of traditional tax scholarship. Those authors who have used social
science methodology in order to describe other aspects of tax have been able to
inform us of trends in Supreme Court decisions about tax, 18 how appellate and trial
courts have decided tax cases and whether who the judges were might have
influenced the judges to decide in favor of the taxpayer or the governmene 9 or how
they justified the decisions, 20 and what might have led to settling cases brought in the
Tax Court. 21 They, too, have identified patterns not presented by those who have
engaged in traditional legal scholarship. 22
This Article is also intended to prompt discussion about how judicial doctrines
are used in federal tax opinions and to act as a platform for further research. In
addition to the obvious question of whether the results can be replicated in another
database, will other results emerge? Would refining the questions posed lead to
more finely etched results? Would a more comprehensive database lead to more
nuanced conclusions'?
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. First, the literature
regarding use of judicial doctrines in tax is summarized. Next, the methodology
used to create the database is set forth. Third, results are laid out. And, finally, the
paper concludes, both summarizing the data and suggesting areas that merit further
examination.

18

See Staudt d al., supra note 2.

19

Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins Federal
Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. TAX REV.
201 (2005) [hereinafter, Schneider, Social Background]; Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and
Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 473 (2002)
[hereinafter, Schneider, Assessing].
20

Schneider, Statutory, supra note 7; Schneider, Empirical, supra note 7.

21

Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial'!: An Empirical Study of Predictors of
Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315 ( 1999).
22

See generalZv Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63 (2008) (arguing for "content analysis," and combining social
science methodology with legal research). Another attractive theory is new legal realism. See
generallr Howard Erlanger et al., New Legal Realism Symposium: l1· It Time for a New Legal
Realism:', 2005 W1s L. REv. 335, 339-45 (2005) (calling tor empirical research, but still an
engagement of realism with policy).
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II. LITERATURE

The articles and essays written about judicial tax doctrines are doctrinal or
normative and tend to describe issues such as the development of the economic
substance doctrine or variations of the step transaction doctrine. They do not,
however, reveal the types of conclusions that may be drawn from empirically
oriented research." 3 They fail to comprehend taxpayers' (occasionally successful)
assertions of judicial doctrines and of patterns surrounding these assertions-by any
party-and use and possible associations between these assertions and litigants'
prevailing in how doctrines are applied. 24 The data presented in this Article cannot
be understood without knowing about what exists, and so Part II of this Article
describes the current literature. 25 Set forth below arc an introduction to literature
about judicial doctrines, descriptions of the doctrines' origins and development, and
analysis of taxpayers' inability to disavow the form of the transaction they have
cast. 26

A. Introduction
When establishing one's obligations in our voluntary system to pay income tax, a
line can be drawn from denial to acceptance of that responsibility. 27 A taxpayer who
(understandably) is reluctant to accept her obligation to pay a tax may choose either
to evade or just avoid it. The "lesser" of these evils--avoidance-may be said to
represent a taxpayer's lawful attempt to reduce tax. 28 Clearly legitimate examples of
23

See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.

24
Compare, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 ( 1935) (finding adequate proof by
government and government won), discussed supra text accompanying notes 8-10, with
Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1935)
(finding failure of proof by government and taxpayer won), discussed infra text accompanying
note 43.

For the tew examples of the broad views taken in this area, see generally BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 9, at~ 4.3.1; RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937).
25
See also Staudt et a!., supra note 2, at 1912, n.l 0 (looking at "the actual--as opposed to
assumed" methods of interpreting the Code or what ·'is" instead of what "ought" the law be.
(citation omitted)).
26
0ther than that altering the torm of a transaction is a one-way street, running in the
government's direction, infra Part Il.E, there does not appear to be any difference among the
doctrines based on whether the government, the court, or the taxpayer raises them. Substance
over form, for example, is the same in each party's hands. As is noted below, in_fi·a text
following note 115, the taxpayer is theoretically unable to argue for application of the business
purpose, economic substance or sham transaction doctrines.

27

See Bullen v. Wis., 240 U.S. 625, 630-631 ( 1916).

28 See

id. (finding evasion on wrong side of the line; presumably, avoidance is not). See
also PAUL, supra note 24, at 9. Randolph Paul is credited with clarifying (and maintaining)
the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion, so that the interchangeable use of the
terms has ceased. See Harrop A. Freeman & Lewis H. Kirschner, An Ounce of Prevention: A
Study in Corporate Tax Avoidance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 951, 952, n.5 (1946) (underscoring
Paul's importance in distinguishing between the two concepts). See generally BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 9, at~ 4.3.1.
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avoidance include taking advantage of a statutory scheme 29 or qualifying a
transaction under a statute for favored tax status. 10 Less legitimate instances are
resisted by the government, at least when taxpayers' transgressive behaviors
becomes apparent. Tax avoidance is not inappropriate; as Judge Learned Hand
(famously) said, "there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep
taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for
nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands." 31 These
observations having been made, it is also apparent that taxpayers, the government,
and courts have devoted substantial resources to ascertaining where on this line
taxpayers place themselves. 32
Statutory rules cannot encompass every transaction if they address only the
objective requirements of taxpayer compliance. Gregory's attempted reorganization
illustrates this point, since the transaction literally met the terms of the statute, but
still failed to qualify for its benefits. 33 While the Code sometimes uses less specific
rules to establish tax liability, 34 our tax system tends to rely on ascertainable statutory
standards, such that the "softer" guidelines that leaven the Code are usually found
elsewhere. 35 Judicial doctrines are a source for these more subjective signposts that
direct taxpayers towards appropriate behavior. As noted, the most common judicial
tax doctrines, and those examined in this article, are: business purpose, economic
substance, sham transaction, step transaction, and substance over form. 36
29

E.g., I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (2000) (discussing a higher tax bracket taxpayer's payment of
alimony instead of child support to custodial ex-spouse in a lower tax bracket, in order to
subject income paid to lower rate of tax).
30

E.g., Being married or a partner, so that recognition of gain may be avoided when
transferring property to one's spouse or to the partnership. I.R.C. §§ 104l(a) (man·iage), 721
(partnership) (2000).
31

Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, L., dissenting), cert.

denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947).
32

Tax avoidance necessarily entails intent because a taxpayer plans to minimize, or avoid,
tax, instead of awakening one day and discovering it just happened; but other causes of tax
avoidance include societal sensitivity to the activity and the government's need to raise
revenue. See Assaf Livhovski, The Duke and the Ladv: Helvering v. Gregory and the History
of Tax Avoidance AdjudicaTion, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 991-995 (2004); Joseph Bankman,
The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Harry J. Rudick. The Problem
of Personal Income Tax Avoidance, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 245 ( 1940); PAUL, supra
note 24, at 74-79, 86.
33

See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-470 ( 1935).

34

See, e.g., David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX
LAW. 235,238, n.7 (1999) (citing I.R.C. §§ 446(b), 269, 770l(f)).
3

"See id. at 236-37. For more analysis of the tension between the text of the Code and
non literal interpretations of it, see Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and
Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. I (2004); Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism
and Substance-Over-Form Doctrines in the Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699 (2003);
Heen, supra note I .
36

See supra text following note 12 (lists doctrines). For the typicity of these doctrines, sec,
e.g., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 9, at~ 4.3 (discussing separately substance over form,
business purpose, economic substance and step transaction). Much of the earlier literature
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B. Earzv Development
7

Gregory v. Helvering' is usually thought of as the seminal case on judicial
doctrines in tax. 38 But a review of decisions rendered before Gregory and of the
literature that analyzes those decisions reveal the earlier existence of these doctrines
and, more importantly, the tension-between reading statutes literally and
unintended results that flow from such strict construction-with which these
doctrines were designed to cope. 39
In some ways, Gregory reflects an exercise in line-drawing. Not long before it
was decided, Justice Holmes wrote, in Bullen v. Wisconsin 40 :

We do not speak of evasion, because. when the law draws a line, a case is
on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse
legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law permits.

focused on avoidance in various areas, such as corporate tax, whether in the formalities
attached to that form of doing business or to reorganizations, or individual taxation.
Regarding corporate tax, see, e.g., Norris Darrell, Recent Developments in Nontaxable
Reorganizations and Stock Dividends, 61 HARV. L. REV. 95R (194R); Richard W. Case,
Disregard of Co1porate Entity in Federal Taxation. The Modern Approach, 30 VA. L. REV.
398 (1944); Milton Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to 'Reorganizations,' 38 CoLUM. L.
REV. 98 (1938); Maurice Finkelstein. The Corporate Entitv and the Income Tax, 44 YALE L.J.
436 (1935); Note, Income Taxation: Recognition of Gain or Loss in Corporate
Reorganizations, 24 VA. L. REV. 418 ( 193R); Note, Taxation: Income Tax. Tax Effect of
Reorganization Provisions, 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 142 (1937). And, as to personal tax, see, e.g ..
Charles LB. Lowndes, Tax Avoidance and the Estate Tax, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 309
(1940); Rudick, supra note 32; Note, Proposals fbr Preventing Familv Tax Avoidance, 57
YALE L.J. 788 ( 1948); Note. The Tax Reduction Motive within the Familv Unit, 47 COI.liM. L.
REV. 665 ( 1947); Note. lntra-Fami~y Assignments and Income Taxation: Use o(the C01porate
Form as a Means of Tax Avoidance, 57 YALE L.J. 308 ( 1947); Note, Taxation. Losses
Establishedfor Income Tax Pzaposes hy Indirect Sales between Members of a Family. 33 VA.
L. REV. 95 (1947). See general~v JOINT H. S. COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF PRESENT-LAW TAX RULES AND RECENT PROPOSALS RELATINCi TO CORPORATE
TAX SHELTERS, JCX-84-99 (Corum. Print 1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/ii.b_-judicial_doctrines _ii.pdf
37

Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).

38

See, e.g., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 9, at '11'11 4.3.3 (discussing form vcrsm
substance), 4.3.4 (discussing business purpose); Bankman, supra note 32, at 7-8 (discussing
economic substance).
39

See, e.g., United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921) (discussing substance versus
form), cited in BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 9, at '1J 4.3.3, n.30; RANDOLPH E. PAUL,
SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, (2d Series 1938) (containing numerous citations to
pre-Gregory cases in discussion of step transaction); Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's
Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 441 ( 1968) (stating Judge
Hand's contribution to discussion of substance versus form began "with an opinion involving
the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909" decided in 1918 (citation omitted)).
40
240 U.S. 625 (1916) (finding Wisconsin able to impose inheritance tax on out-of-state
trust of decedent, who had been a Wisconsin resident before he died).
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When an act i~ condemned as an evasion what is meant is that it is on the
wrong side ofthe line 41
He continued, however. by stating that the ''wrong side'' is "indicated by the
policy if not by the mere letter of the law," 42 thereby underscoring the ephemeral
nature of the line, in case anyone had nai"vely thought it had been drawn sharply.
While Gregory had not engaged in tax evasion, what she did was still deemed tax
avoidance and so was on that side of a line in which intended tax benefits were
disallowed. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 43 a case contemporaneous with Gregory,
illustrates the other side. The Chisholm taxpayers were among those who formed a
partnership for which their admitted intent was to avoid the taxes that they otherwise
would have incurred if they, instead of the partnership, sold stock that they had
contributed to the partnership. Because the partners also possessed the intent to
conduct business through the partnership, however, the partnership's gain (under
then applicable law) was not taxed to the partners.
As commentators drew these early lines, they paid some attention to where these
doctrines arose, and so some articles clustered around suspect areas, such as
corporate tax, use of the family, and personal income. 44 In many ways, early cases
and commentary about judicial doctrines revealed what would occur as these
doctrines continued to develop.
C. Later Development of the Doctrines

Judicial tax doctrines continued to be used and expanded atter Gregory was
decided in 1935. The doctrines persevere, as they have been invoked recently to
combat tax shelters, especially corporate tax shelters. 45
I. Substance Over Form
Honoring form is not inevitably fatal; formal choices frequently are respected
and, indeed, encouraged. 4 " But relying on the "substance" of a transaction instead of
41

/d. at 630-31. See generally David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-TaxAvoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 88 (2002); David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency
Analysis of Line Dra>~'ing in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL Snm. 71 (2000).
12

Bullenv. Wis.,240U.S.625,63l (1916).

43

79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 64 (1935).

44

See supra note 36.

45

'le<' infm note 75. See gencm//r BORIS !. BITTKER & J ;\MESS. E\JSTICF, FEDERAL [1\iCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS~ 5.10 (7th ed. 2000) (discussing corporate
tax shelters and various responses to them). Sre also Jason Quinn, Comment, Being Punished
.fhr Obeying the Rules: Corporate Tax Planning and the Overlv Broad Economic Substance
Doctrine, 15 Gtu. MASON L. REv. I 041 (2008) (discussing the seemingly disproportionate
amount of victories by the government compared to individuals when judicial doctrines are
invoked); Timothy R. Hicks, Comment, Government Victories Using the Economic Substance
Doctrine: A Changing of'the Tide ill Tax Practice, 31\ CUMH. L. REV. 10! (2007) (same).
46

E.g., Formerly married taxpayers may reduce overall tax by having the higher bracket
taxpayer pay alimony instead of child support to the lower bracket taxpayer.
Formal
requirements for alimony and child support are set lorth at I.R.C. § 7l(b)-(c) (2000) but. if
met, the tax reduction is permitted.
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its "form" may lead, as it did in Gregory, to taxing someone on receipt of stock
received in a corporate reorganization as a dividend-a less apparent result--instead
of permitting non-recognition of the gain from the receipt-the more obvious
outcome. Because Gregory received something upon which she should have been
taxed, the umbrella of non-recognition, technically and formally available to
reorganizations, was not applicable because the substance of what she had done was
not really a reorganization. 47
Another benchmark of this doctrine, decided twenty-tive years after Gregory, is
Knetsch v. United States. 4 g Knetsch bought annuity bonds, largely with money he
borrowed, on which he was charged 3.5 percent interest and for which the security
was the cash surrender value of the bonds, even though the bonds only paid 2.5
percent interest. He wanted to take a large deduction quickly in order to diminish the
amount of otherwise taxed current income and was able to achieve his goal by
paying a point more to borrow money than he would receive from the purchased
instrument. Knetsch failed to offer evidence of another, nontax reason for the
transaction, and so the Supreme Court disallowed his deduction because "there was
nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction beyond a tax
deduction. " 49
Immediately after conceding the difficulty of summarizing substance over form
cases, Professors B ittker and Lokken (authors of a standard federal tax treatise)
suggest that a common thread among these cases may be that the government most
often succeeds in asserting the doctrine when transactions take place between related
parties. 50 While the Tax Court has attempted to articulate an objective test for
applying the doctrine by listing several criteria, Bittker and Lokken still reduce the
reason to reject the doctrine's application to instances where "a transaction is
consummated in a form that fairly reflects its substance," even if the taxpayer has
chosen the form to obtain greater tax benefits. 51
2. Sham
Sometimes a transaction is disregarded because it is considered a sham. In a case
where this doctrine was not used, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 52 the Supreme

47

See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465
( 1935) (clearer statement in appellate decision than Supreme Court opinion of litigants'
positions).
48

364 U.S. 361 ( 1960).

49

/d. at 366. See generally Walter J. Blum, Knetsch v. U.S.: A Pronouncement on Tax
Avoidance, 40 TAXES 296 (1962); Walter J. Blum, Knetsch v. U.S.: A Pronouncement on Tax
Avoidance, SUP. CT. REV. 135 (1961).
50

BJTTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 9, at ~14.3.3.

51/d. at 4-40, n.60, noting Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221 ( 1981 ).
See also Esmark, Inc. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 171 ( 1988), ajf'd, 886 F.2d. 1318 (7th Cir. 1989)
(form chosen by taxpayer disregarded and court taxed it on most expensive form that led to
same economic consequence; substance of transaction not altered in the process). Bittker and
Lokken, however, suggest that this extension of the substance over form doctrine is not much
followed. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 9, at ,14.3.3 nn. 72-73.
52

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
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Court refused to treat a taxpayer's purchase and leaseback of a building back to the
seller as a sham because regulatory constraints had been imposed on the seller and
because multiple parties were involved, each with competing interests. 53
If external forces that impose a particular form onto a transaction negate
characterizing it as a sham, what, then, is a sham? Case law establishes two types,
shams in substance and shams in fact, the difference between them being that "shams
in fact are transactions that never occur [while] . . . shams in substance are
transactions that actually occurred but which lack the substance their form
represents." 54 The leading Supreme Court decision in the area just noted, Frank
Lyon, addressed what constituted sham in fact, and concluded that it could test for
such a sham by applying a two-step test. As the Fourth Circuit in Rice's Toyota
World v. Commissioner then characterized Frank Lyon:
To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was
motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in
entering the transaction, and that the transaction has no economic
substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists. 5 5
Courts have applied this test in many ways. As Rice's Toyota World suggests,
the sham transaction doctrine applies only if there is no business purpose for, and no
economic substance to, the transaction. 56 Other courts, however, have viewed the
doctrine differently, suggesting that the sham transaction doctrine applies even if
only one of the two tests is met 57 or if the transaction possesses "economic effects"
(instead of "economic substance") but lacks a business purpose. 58 And some courts
simply scrutinize transactions more closely. 59 Even assuming that the appropriate
standard for the sham transaction doctrine has been ascertained, how to define the
appropriate standard-business purpose and/or economic substance/effects-remains
to be decided. 60
53
5

I d. at 58 I -84.

~Kirchman v. CIR, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (I lth Cir. 1989).

55

Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89,91 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
56I d.
57

1ES Indus. Inc. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001 ).

sxUnited Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (I Ith Cir. 200I), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
986 (2002). See also Coltec Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (economic
substance, not economic effects); H.J. Heinz Co. v. U.S., 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (2007) (sham
transaction existed); Ethan Yale, Was Hein::: 's Two-Step Redemption a Sham:;, 117 TAX NOTES
345 (2007) (arguing that application of sham transaction was argued by government too
aggressively).
59

ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017
(1999).
60

Both of those doctrines are discussed below, inf'ra Parts II.C.3-4. See generally BITTKER
& LoKKEN, supra note 9, at 'I) 4.3.4A; Peter J. Connors et al., Recent Cases Involving the
Economic Sham Transaction Doctrine-Or Whatever They Are Calling It Now, in I 0 TAX
STRATECi!ES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-0FFS, JOINT VENTURES,
fiNANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURING 126] (2004 ).
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3. Business Purpose
Lack of a business purpose for the corporate division was one of the reasons the
taxpayer lost in Gregory. 61 In Goldstein 1·. Commissioner, 62 Goldstein, like the
Knetsch taxpayer, 63 tried to deduct an expense in order to minimize tax on a
substantial amount of income (caused by winning the Irish Sweepstakes). Also as in
Knetsch, Goldstein borrowed, and paid interest of 1.5 percent, to buy bonds that paid
0.5 percent interest, using the bonds as collateral for the loan. The Second Circuit
decided in favor of the government and, while its decision was spcci fie to Code ~
163, its opinion applies more generally as well. The court perceived a Congressional
policy in encouraging people to borrow, but also demanded "some substance to the
loan arrangement beyond the taxpayer's desire to secure the deduction," for which
borrowing at a rate that exceeded the return on the investment, even taking
appreciation into account, was inadequate evidenceh4 Thus, a taxpayer's mere, and
sole, intent to reduce taxes exposes her planned transaction to the business purpose
doctrine.
4. Economic Substance
The Circuits are presently divided on what test should be used in deciding
whether a transaction lacks economic substance. 65 In a recent articulation of the
economic substance test, ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,r' 6 the Third Circuit
said:
The inquiry into whether the taxpayer's transactions had sut1icient
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes turns on both the
"objective economic substance of the transactions" and the "subjective
business motivation" behind them .... However, these distinct aspects of
the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a "rigid
two-step analysis," but rather represent related factors both of which
inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance.
apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes. 67

61

See Gregory v. Helvering. 293 U.S. 465 ( 1935 ).

62
Knetsch v. United States, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005
(1967).

63/d
64

/d. at 740-42. Interestingly, based upon the facts (essentially, the substance of these
loans were that they were loans). the court declined to characterize the scheme as a sham. !d.
at 737-40.
65

See Hicks, supra note 45, at Ill.

66 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998). See general/r Bankman, supra note 32; Hariton, supra
note 34.
67

ACM P"ship, 157 F.3d at 247. Bankman suggests that the "current version'' of the
economic substance doctrine can be traced to this decision. Bankman, supra note 32, at R.
See generally Richard M. Lipton, Countrvside: Th<' Tax Court R<'iects an IRS Challenge to the
Economic Substance of a Real Deal,· 108 J. TAx'N 137 (2008); Dennis J. Vcntry, Jr., Sm·ing
the Economic Substance Doctrine from Congre.1s, 118 TAX NOTES 1405 (2008); David P.
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The court continued, defining the objective criterion as whether the transaction
had any practical economic etTect, other than generating a deduction for a loss, and
the subjective one as whether the taxpayer had any business purpose, which it did
not. 6 x The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits agreed with the Third that a two prong
approach is not required to tind lack of economic substance. 69 However, the First,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the two different prongs
of the test must both exist to satisfy the economic substance tese 0 ; the Second and
Fourth Circuits only require one. 71
5. Step Transaction
While one may say, half seriously, that the step transaction doctrine is the most
finely etched of judicial tax doctrines, the truth of this assertion lies more in the
clarity of the doctrine's articulation than in its application. There are three varieties
of the step transaction doctrine, all of which may be reduced to showing that the
steps taken by the taxpayer in a transaction were motivated by tax considerations,
and that the form of the transaction should be disregarded when assessing the tax
liability of the taxpayer. In the variations of the step transaction doctrine test, one
either looks at the end result of multiple transactions, for steps that are mutually
interdependent, or for steps for which there are binding commitments; interestingly,
all of these tests appear to have been recognized as early as the 1930s.'" The step
transaction doctrine pervades several areas of tax law, especially corporate tax and
estate planning, but has been used more prominently in recent years in cases
involving corporate tax and complicated financial and business transactions. 73

D. Codification ofJudicial Doctrines
Some commentators have called for "codification" ofjudicial doctrines, either by
amending the Code or by issuing new regulations, in order to minimize problems
caused by the patchwork character of judicial doctrines. 74 Some commentators
Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Suhstanc<' Doctrine Be Applied:), 60 TAX L.
REV. 29 (2006).
68

ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 248-52.252-64.

69

See Merryman v. Comm'r. 873 F.2d 879.881 (5th Cir. 1989); Sacks v. Comm'r, 69 F.3d
982, 988 (9th Cir. 1995); Keeler v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1212. 1217-19 (I Oth Cir. 200 I).
70

See Dewees v. Comm'r, 870 F.2d 21, 34 (1st Cir. 1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 435 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2006); Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir.
1988); IES Indus. Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001 ); United Parcel Serv.
v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (II th Cir. 2001 ).
71

See Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm'r, 320 F.3d 282. 284 (2d Cir. 2002); Rice's Toyota
World v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89,91 (4th Cir. 1985).
72

See, e.g .. StephenS. Bowen, The End Result Test, 72 TAXES 722 (1994); PAUL, supra
note 39, at 200-52, 228-29 (ultimate result), 252-54 (interdependency test).
See generally BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 9, at ~ 4.3.5, especially note 90 (areas in
which doctrine is used); PAUL, supra note 39, at 202-14.
73

74

These calls tend to accompany articles about the recent surge of corporate tax shelters.
In addition to the literature mentioned in(i·a notes 75-78, see, e.g., Steven A. Dean &
Lawrence Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX
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would codify judicial doctrines broadly, in order to deter taxpayers, especially tax
shelter promoters, ti·um egregious behavior. 75 Others have noted Congress' ability to
successfully incorporate doctrines elsewhere in the Code, such as in sections 355 and
368, and thus think that Congress could act efticiently here as well. 76 Still others
would take an even more rigorous approach, enacting some sort of statutory antiabuse provision. 77 However, the Department of the Treasury remains reluctant to
support any type of codification. 7 ~ It should be noted, however, that in recent years,
Congress has had the opportunity to codify judicial doctrines and. while it has taken
some steps in that direction, the path to codification is hazy and much work remains
to be done. 79
E. The One-Way Street and a Ta"\payer's Abili(v to Disavow Form

One final topic raised by the literature merits discussion: Is a taxpayer able to
assert judicial tax doctrines? Generally, little attention is paid to who may raise
judicial doctrines. One possible reason for this ennui is the perception that the
taxpayer should be estopped; having cast the form of the transaction subsequently
challenged by the government, the taxpayer should bear the burden of defending the
legitimacy of the form chosen.xu The taxpayer should have chosen the "more
favorable way" when she originally had the chance, and, in any case, the government
should not be whipsawed by the taxpayer's subsequent, and contradictory, choice.x 1
REV. 879 (2007); Kristen Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905
(2007).
75

See Mmtin J. McMahon, Jr.. Economic Substance. Purposive Activity, and Corporate
Tax Shelters, Tax Notes, 94 TAX NOTES 1017 (2002).
76
See Ellen Aprill, Tax Shelters. Ten: Law. and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54
S.M.U. L. REV. 9 (2001 ).
77

See, e.g., Marvin Chirelstein & Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search .for a
Silver Bullet. 105 CoLUM. l.. REv. 1939 (2005) (supporting enacting broad legislation or
delegating authority to Treasury Department to dratl broad regulations, to disallow
noneconomic losses); George K. Yin, CJetting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a
Lesson .fi'om History, 54 S.M.U. L. RFV. 209, 220-224 (200 I) (supporting taxing public
corporations on income reported for financial purposes); Peter C. Canellos, A Tax

Practitioner's Penpective on Substance. Form and Business Pw1wse in Structuring Business
Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 47, 70-71 (2001) (supporting greater
reporting and penalties).
78
See, e.g., Donald Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why Today 's
Thoughtfzd U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to "Just Say No," in 26 TAX

STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE AC<)UISITillNS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-0FFS, JOINT VENTURES,
fiNANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 189. 268 (Practicing Law Institute 2007).

See generallv BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 45, at~ 5.1 0[8] (noting various proposals
and ultimate legislation).
79

~ 0 See PAUL,

supra note 39; PAUL, supra note 24. at 62.

81

Sf'e Comm'r v. Danielson. 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858
(1967). See also Comm'r v. Nat'! Altalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 (1974);
Norwest Corp. v. Comm'r. Ill T.C. 105 (1998). See genera!lv BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 9, at~~ 4.3.6-.7; Kenneth Harris, Should There Be A "Form Consistencv" Requirement'
Danielson Revisited, 78 TAXES 88,95-98 (2000); WilliamS. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street:
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While whether the taxpayer may assert a judicial doctrine is an old problem, 82
much of the discussion about it is more current. In Commissioner v. Daniel.wn,~ 3 the
taxpayers sold their stock in a business. with some of the purchase price allocated to
the stock sold and some to their covenant not to compete with the buyer. Sales
proceeds allocable to the stock led to capital gain, while proceeds allocable to the
covenant led to more highly taxed ordinary income. After the sale, the government
challenged the taxpayers' characterization of all of their income as capital gain and
the taxpayers, in part, tried to set aside the allocation to which they had agreed when
they sold their stock. The Third Circuit decided in the government's favor, taxing
the sellers on ordinary income from the covenant not to compete to which they had
agreed, holding that:
a party can challenge the tax consequences of his agreement as construed
by the Commissioner only by adducing proof which in an action between
the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter that construction
or to show its unenforceability because of mistake. undue intluence, fraud,
duress. etc.x 4
Thus, assertion of a judicial doctrine in tax has been viewed largely as a one-way
street, open to the government and, if open to the taxpayer, then under stringent
conditions, such as the existence of traud or mistake, that do not attach to the
government's reliance on the same doctrines.' 5
Having laid the groundwork of doctrinal and normative literature about judicial
tax doctrines. the article now turns to the methodology with which the database was
constructed. as well as the results of and conclusions drawn from it.
Ill. METHODOLOGY

The conclusions set forth in Part IV are understood more easily against the
backdrop of how the database was constructed. Therefore, that methodology is
described in this portion of the Article.

The Tmpavcr "s Ahililr lo Disamw Form. 70 ORE. L. REV. 384 ( 1991 ); Saul Lcvmore,
Rcchar,tcleri::.ution
Corporule
and the 1\'alure o/Titcor1· ill
Tax Law, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1019
( 1988).
'

2

,\'ec, e.g .. Chirclstcin. wpru note 3'i. at 471.

''Danielson. 3 78 F.2d at 77 3.
'

4

1d. at 775.

''See, e.g .. BI r IKE!< &

LOKKf N.

supra note 9. at

,r,;

4.3.6-.7; Blatt, supra note RI;

Lcvmon:. supra note XI.
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A. Data

1. Cases Examined and Period Covered
Only cases in which decisions were rendered by judges were examined. 86 A
judge's decision to apply judicial doctrines is driven by facts and circumstances.
The law is clear, not the facts. Thus, it seemed appropriate to examine decisions
rendered by trial courts, the finder of fact in our legal system. Decisions were
gleaned from an on-line search and were drawn from all three of the trial courts in
the federal system in which tax cases are litigated.x 7 Decisions were further limited
to those decided between 1993 and 2006. 88

86

See generallv Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence un the Selection
Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL Snm. 145 (1990) (explaining
why cases may go to trial); George B. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 4 ( 1984) (explaining that the reasons why parties settle or
litigate "are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse
decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of success at trial, and the
direct costs of litigation and settlement'').
The database is available online at
http://Ia w. n iu. edu/lawI fa cui tyI directoryI schneider/index. shtm I.
87

If a taxpayer pays a tax and then seeks a retund, she would litigate her case in a district
court or in the Court of Federal Claims. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)( I)
(2006) (regarding district court and Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction). If she does not pay
the tax, but still litigates her liability, then she would proceed to the Tax Court. I.R.C. §§
7441-42, 6212, 6213(a) (regarding Tax Court jurisdiction).
The search was done on Westlaw, which provided better results than the comparable
search on Lexis. The search term was: (substance /10 form) (business /10 purpose) (step /10
transaction) (Gregory /10 Helvering) (economic /10 substance) (sham /10 transaction) & DA
(l the appropriate year J).
This search was made in Westlaw's database of cases decided by district courts (FTXDCT), the Tax Court (FTX-TC), and the Claims Court (FEDCL); and was done for each of the
fourteen years included in the database, infi·a note 88 (describing period covered). See
Schneider, Social Background. supra note 19, Schneider, Assessing, supra note 19, Schneider,
Statutory. supra note 7, and Schneider, Empirical, supra note 7, for other searches of tax cases
and how they were organized.
My earlier empirical research about trial courts in the two articles noted in the prior
Assessing, and Schneider, Empirical-excluded the Court of Federal
Claims. It is a more specialized court than the district court. but the small population of cases
in this database made the ease and importance of including these cases more compelling.
Only regular decisions of the Tax Court, and not its memorandum decisions, were analyzed.
paragraph-~Sehneider,

xsThis fourteen year period is a recent and long enough period to minimize the risk that
lesser and less recent periods of time might have presented. Compare Schneider, Assessing,
supra note 19 (regarding a twenty year period), and Schneider, Social Background, supra note
19 (regarding a ten year period), with Staudt et al., supra note 2 (regarding an eighty-eight
year period). Initially, only a five year period was used and it offered some tentative
conclusions, but expansion ofthe years covered led to more robust results.
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2. Units of Analysis
89

Any case in which one of the five judicial doctrines already noted was raised
was examined further. Once a case was selected, information about the case and the
doctrine were entered into the database. Each reference to a doctrine in an opinion
comprised a single unit of analysis. 90 Information was also entered about the briefs
made available on-line, if any, for the cases that were transformed into units of
analysis.

B. Variables and Other Information
The variables selected were designed to illuminate the use of judicial doctrines in
federal tax controversies. The information gathered about the cases included:
•

the court in which the case was decided 91 ;

•

the year of the decision;

•

the taxpayer's legal status 92 (e.g., individual, corporation);

•

was the taxpayer represented by a lawyer 9\

•

who won the case 94 ; and

89

See supra Introduction.

90
Because units of analysis were organized around the appearance of doctrines, multiple
references in a decision to such doctrines (or multiple references to one doctrine) led to
multiple units--~one for each reference.
91
These courts were the Tax Court, the district court (including particular districts,
although that information is not used in this article), and the Court of Federal Claims. See
supra note 87.
92

Taxpayers were divided into several categories. which were then reduced to four: a step
intended to aid statistical analysis. These categories are: "individuals," "trusts and estates"
(which included trusts and estates), "businesses" (which includes partnerships and
corporations) and "other" (which included govemments, nonprofit organizations and trustees).
93

The taxpayer's legal representation was usually noted at the beginning of a case or
sometimes, if a docket was available for the case, in the docket. For a recent article about the
positive etTect of taxpayers' legal representation in cases that resulted in Tax Court decisions,
sec Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An
Empirical Study of' LaHJ•ers · Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1235 (2006 ). See also Schneider, Social Background, supra note 19, at 226-27.
94
The winner of a case was ascertained by examining multiple factors. At the very least, I
did not have expectations about where my analysis would lead, which somewhat diminished
the risk of bias in making these subjective judgments. It was important, of course, to
dichotomize who won into two parties in order to promote statistical analysis. A decision
stated by the court as in favor of the govcmmcnt or against the taxpayer was taken at face
value, but was fortified by reading the case to confirm independently the court's conclusion.
Even if the party which otherwise appeared to have won did not have all of its expectations
met--for example, the taxpayer paid some portion of the tax it argued it had never owed-that
party was still treated as the winner.
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questions about judicial doctrines; including:

•

which of the five judicial doctrines was raised;

•

who raised the doctrine-had the government, the taxpayer, or the
court, essentially said, as revealed hy the judge's opinion "I'd like to
have the business purpose (or the step transaction, etc.) doctrine
applied (or not applied) in this decision";

•

two related questions- --did the party that raised a doctrine want it
applied or not. and on whose behalf did the party that raised the
doctrine want the court to act,"'

•

did the litigants' briefs cast light on any of the above questions, on
doctrines they had raised but which were not used by the court. or on
the one-way rule;

•

which litigant prevailed in the court's decision about applying a
doctrine, regardless of whether that litigant raised the doctrine or even
wanted the doctrine applied on its behalfl 6 ;

•

was a doctrine applied because of statutory or regulatory directive 97 ;

•

the area of tax law discussed by the court \\hen examining the judicial
doctrine under scrutiny'JX; and

53

95

Because judicial doctrines are invoked to recast transactions, it was appropriate to
classify a party as "not wanting a doctrine applit:d" when that party raised the antithesis of the
doctrine's application. For example, assume that the taxpayer argued that it possessed a
business purpose for the transaction under scrutiny. That case is treated as one in which the
taxpayer raised a doctrine and did not want that doctrine applied.
If the taxpayer argued that it had a business purpose, it presumably would have asked the
court to act on its behalf as well with respect to the doctrine. Whether that would be the case
was not clear when the research began, and so both questions were asked.
96

Judgments were made about this issue similar to who won a case. See, supra note 94.
To follow through on the prior footnote, if the court agreed with the government about
substance over fi.1rm, and. therefore, decided on the government's behalf, the government
prevailed in having the doctrine applied. If the court disagreed about application of the
substance over form doctrine and decided on the taxpayer's behal( the taxpayer prevailed,
because the doctrine was not applied. Conversely, if the court agreed with the taxpayer that
use of the business purpose doctrine was inappropriate, the taxpayer prevailed in the doctrine's
use. If the court disagreed and applied the business purpose doctrine, the government
prevailed in the doctrine's use.
97
A doctrine was so invoked in only thirty of the 378 units of analysis, and used in all but
two of them. Eighteen involved I.R.C. § 6621, six addres~ed § 165, two addressed ~ 355, and
the other four examined four other ~ections. Because of the small number of cases in which
regulatory or statutory dictates triggered use of a doctrine, current literature notwithstanding,
infra Part TI.D (calling H1r coditication of judicial doctrines), no further analysis was done
about a statutory directive for a doctrine's application.
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when the taxpayer raised a doctrine, had the opinion noted that raising
judicial doctrines is a one-way street and, if so, did it apply the one99
way rule to prevent the taxpayer from asserting a judicial doctrine.

The questions designed to elicit data about judicial doctrines may be
illustrated with the following five examples:
Example I. A court's opinion states that "the government argues" that the
substance of a transaction, as opposed to the form the taxpayer had used,
was such that the taxpayer should be denied the tax benefit it sought (e.g.,
an exclusion from gross income or deduction of an expense). The court
sides with the government and decides in its favor, and does so by relying
on the substance over form doctrine.
This case is coded as the government raising a doctrine, wanting the
doctrine it had raised to be applied, and prevailing in having the doctrine
applied. If the court decided not to apply the substance over form
doctrine. then the case would be coded as the taxpayer having prevailed in
the doctrine's use. The doctrine used, of course, is substance over form.
Example 2. An opinion says that "the taxpayer suggests" that it possessed
a business purpose for the transaction in which it engaged. The court
agrees, finding a business purpose for the taxpayer's action, and so allows
the taxpayer its intended tax benefits.

9

~The areas were: "accounting," "capital assets,'" "business" (including two areas initially
coded separately, corporate and partnership (the other, narrower, areas from which the
ultimate groupings in this footnote are derived are also set forth in parentheses)),
"criminal/procedure" (criminal and procedure), "deduction," "employment" (employment and
pension), "estate/gift" (estate and gift), ""income," and "other" (bankruptcy, excise, exempt,
t<xeign, insurance, and natural resources). As with the type of taxpayer, supra note 92, larger
categories were established in order to enhance statistical analysis. The sections discussed by
a court when examining the judicial doctrine under review were also collected, and have been
used in the past. See generally Schneider, Social Background, supra note 19; Schneider,
Assessing, supra note 19; Schneider, Statutory, supra note 7; and Schneider, Empirical, supra
note 7. But this has its problems, so the general substantive area of tax law around which a
case revolved--admittedly a subjective judgment~was used.

Initial research led to further highlighting of three distinct areas, to see whether cases
involving judicial doctrines were aggregated in these areas. These cases involved corporate
owned life insurance programs, transactions patently characterized as a tax shelter, and
transactions that I thought might be characterized as a tax shelter (even absent the comt's
explicit labeling, such as foreign currency swaps, tax straddles, and programs marketed to lead
their purchasers to put their assets in a thinly veiled separate entity, leading to alter
ego/nominee questions).
Data about the judge who decided the case and about that judge's social background were
also collected. Preliminary results based on this data were not meaningful, and so that line of
inquiry was not pursued.
99

See infi·a Part ll.E.
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In this case, the appropriate coding is that the taxpayer raised a
doctrine, the doctrine was the business purpose doctrine, the taxpayer did
not want the doctrine applied, and the taxpayer prevailed in the doctrine's
use. Because the taxpayer's assertion of its business purpose for the
transaction negates application of the business purpose doctrine, it is
appropriate to code the case as one in which the taxpayer did not want the
doctrine applied. Because the doctrine was not applied-the taxpayer's
litigating posture-it is also appropriate to characterize the case as one in
which the taxpayer prevailed. Because the taxpayer did not want the
doctrine applied, it is also appropriate to characterize the case as one in
which the party that raised the doctrine--the taxpayer-wanted the court
to act in its behalf and not the government's.
Example 3. In its opinion, a court articulates the importance of, and
decides to apply. the sham transaction doctrine. It does not attribute the
doctrine's presence in the case to either litigant, but instead discusses the
doctrine as if the doctrine's application is appropriate and then applies the
doctrine. The taxpayer is denied the tax benefit it sought.
The appropriate coding in Example 3 is that the court raised a
doctrine, the doctrine raised was the sham transaction doctrine, the court
wanted the doctrine to be applied (or, stated less awkwardly, that it
intended to apply the doctrine), and that the government prevailed in the
doctrine's use.
Example 4. The facts are similar to the original facts in Example 2,
except that the taxpayer argues that the substance of the transaction is
such that it should be allowed its intended tax benefit. This means that the
taxpayer raised a doctrine, the doctrine was substance over form, the
taxpayer did not want the doctrine applied, and the taxpayer prevailed in
the doctrine's use.
If the court did not note the Danielson case, 100 or otherwise limit the
taxpayer's ability to challenge the form of the transaction, the case is
coded as the "one way" rule having not been raised nor, obviously,
applied. If the court did raise Danielson, but decided that its application
was not appropriate, then the case is coded as the "one way" rule being
raised, but not applied. If the court raised Danielson and decided that the
taxpayer could therefore not vary the form it had chosen for the
transaction, then the case is coded as the "one way" rule having been
raised and applied.
Example 5. The facts are similar to Example I. The parties' briefs reveal
that the government argued for use of the substance over form doctrine.

100
See Comm'r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771. 775 (3d Cir. 1967). See, e.g., supra notes 7,
19 (regarding judges' social backgrounds).
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The case is coded as the government having raised this doctrine in
briefs, that it wanted the doctrine applied, and in a manner otherwise
consistent with the results in Example I.
While these data are the crux of the Article, they are often revealed in less than
ideal circumstances. Data collected sometimes may seem more obvious, as a
researcher of why judges decide cases as they do may be expected to ask about the
gender, race or political affiliation of ideology of the judges under scrutiny. Data
that might illuminate judicial doctrines are different, however, and must be teased
from the circumstances surrounding judicial doctrines--who raised them, what had
the parties done with the doctrines they raised, and who prevailed in the doctrines'
uses. 101 Arguably, equating who was designated by a judge's opinion as having
"raised" a doctrine may not reveal who actually raised it during the course of
litigation. There is, however, evidence that it does, and so asking this question
begins the discussion.
As is explained below, the party that most often raised a doctrine in this database
was the court. Does that suggest that the taxpayer and the government repeatedly
overlooked a doctrine's application? And, if not, does the court's predominant role
suggest that it raised a doctrine rhetorically, and failed to credit the litigant that had
raised the doctrine? In fact, a review of briefs reveals that litigants rarely raised
doctrines. 102 It also quickly became apparent during research that sometimes a party

101
Inferences arc drawn from the data.
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. I (2002).

See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of

102

See infi·a fig. I (showing the court raised the doctrine more than the government or the
taxpayer) and note Ill (briefs).
Nor does procedural posturing-e.g., who must raise an issue in litigation, what failure to
do so means-bar equating who appears to have raised a judicial doctrine, according to an
opinion, with who actually raised it during the course of litigation. The rules surrounding
federal tax litigation are noted below. Generally, they encourage simple pleading and are
designed primarily to put one's opponent on notice, so they stop short of requiring a litigant to
plead a judicial doctrine.
Refund litigation. A taxpayer seeking a refund is subject to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, either because it chooses to litigate in the district court-which is governed by the
Rules--or because it chooses to litigate in the Court of Federal Claims, whose rules
incorporate the Rules. See GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAUGH, LITIGATION OF
FEDERAL CiVIL TAX CONTROVERSIES '1!15.06[3) (2d ed. 1997). The taxpayer generally has the
burden of proving both that the Internal Revenue Service's assessment was incorrect and that
the overpayment of taxes it claims was correct. See id. '1!16.01[1). Nevertheless, the rules of
pleading arc generous, and a taxpayer must file a complaint that is simple, concise and direct,
whether in the district court or the Court of Federal Claims. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(c)(l). Ct.
Fed. Cl. R. 8( e)( 1). All "that is required is sufficient notice of the relief sought and the
grounds on which the relief is based" to withstand the government's "motion for dismissal or
for judgment on the pleadings." KAFKA & CAVANAUGH '1!17.02[1). In addition to containing
denials or statements about the government's lack of knowledge about matters averred in the
complaint, the government's answer also must contain any affirmative defenses, such as
estoppeL fraud or res judicata. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(c), 9(b)-(e). Ct. Fed. Cl. R. 8(c), 9(b).
Finally, it should be noted that the rules of both courts allow pleadings to be liberally
amended. KAFKA & CAVAN AUGH '1!17 .05.
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raised a doctrine, only to suggest that application of the doctrine was not apt (e.g., a
taxpayer who argued that it had a business purpose). These are just a few of the
nuances of the indirect nature ofthis evidence. Nevertheless, useful information was
mined from the data.
The opinions were taken at face value, a decision the importance of which is
underscored in the prior paragraph. Precisely because it was impossible to determine
whether the source of the comt's activity in raising a doctrine was caused by the
litigants' inattention, the court's rhetorical posturing, or some other reason, it was
more reliable simply to note who, using the court's language, had raised a doctrine"the taxpayer says" or "the government argues" or nothing-instead of guessing
what the court might have intended, but failed, to say.
C. Statistical Analyses

Statistical significance for relationships in the results was assessed by appropriate
tests. 103 Binary logistic regression was used to establish relationships between the
independent and dependent variables. 104
Tax Court litigation. A taxpayer contesting a tax liability in the Tax Court faces rules that
are slightly different from the above rules. After receiving a notice of deficiency from the
Service (about its tax), the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court to have its deficiency
redetermined. The burden of proving its case lies with the taxpayer, except for affirmative
defenses, the burden of proof for which lies with the government. See T. Ct. R. 142(a)( I). As
in refund cases, supra, averments in a pleading must be simple, concise, and direct, T. Ct. R.
3 I (b), although they must be more detailed than in refund cases. See KAFKA & CAvANAUGH ~
5.07. Even if the pleadings are somehow det!cient, they can be corrected by an amendment of
the party, either once as of right before the responsive pleading or thereafter by the court's
leave or consent of the adverse party; leave shall be "given treely when justice so requires."
T. Ct. R. 4J(a). Affirmative averments in the government's answer not specifically denied by
the taxpayer in its reply will be deemed admitted. T. Ct. R. 37(c).
These rules encourage putting one's opponent on notice, not pleading every point in one's
case. They do not diminish the possibility that either litigant might raise an issue such as a
judicial doctrine during the course of litigation.
103

Relationships between different variables can always be generated. However, statistical
significance enables one to distinguish between those relationships which arise randomly from
those that are less the subject of chance. Statistical significance is "designed to allow us to
make statements about the probability that hypothetical relationships actually occur"; it
permits the inference that two variables are related, in the population and in the same manner
in the sample, and not merely the result of random association. DA vm KNOKE ET AL.,
STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 21-22, 142 (4th ed. 2002). The Pearson X 2 test was
used for cross-tabulations of dichotomous variables (e.g., who raised a doctrine and whether
that party wanted a doctrine applied).
Statements in this Article about statistical significance refer to testing at p levels ::c_.05.
While literature frequently states the "amount" of significance, e.g., p level .:::_.05, or .:::_.01, this
Article merely sets forth the results that are statistically significant, with respect to the crosstabulations. This Article simply characterizes them as such, without attempting to illustrate
the level of significance, in an attempt make the discussion less confusing. Because more
specific statements about statistical significance may assist the reader in understanding logistic
regressions, the levels of significance are noted infra Part IV.F. See Schneider, Assessing,
supra note 19, at 490 n.61; James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions"!
Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1709
n.l21 ( 1999) (discussing 0.05 and 0.0 I levels of testing for significance).
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IV. RESULTS
A. Introduction

Three-hundred seventy-eight units of analysis were derived from 275 cases, as
some decisions raised more than one doctrine. 105 The results drawn from the data
sustain the article's hypothesis that judicial doctrines are not monopolized by the
government. As is explained below in greater detail, the government, the court, and
the taxpayer, all raised judicial doctrines and it was the court, not the litigants, who
raised doctrines most frequently. It also appears that the court's active role in raising
doctrines occurred because the litigants tended not to raise them. As might be
expected, both of the litigants-the government and the taxpayer-tried to have
judicial doctrines applied for its own benefit but each found that it was more likely to
prevail in a doctrine's use when its opponent had raised the doctrine than when it
did. Substance over form was used more than other doctrines. Specific doctrines
can be associated with specific areas of tax law. The one-way street rule,
theoretically making it difficult for taxpayers to argue that they can vary the form of
a transaction, was largely ignored by the court and the government. Finally,
circumstances enable prediction of which doctrines lead to the government or the
taxpayer prevailing in a doctrine's use.
General observations can be made about the data. 106 For example, the units of
analysis were drawn, in declining amounts, from cases decided by the district courts,
the Tax Court, and the Court of Federal Claims. Most of the taxpayers were
characterized as individuals or businesses or, to a lesser extent, as estates or trusts.
The government prevailed in a doctrine's use about twice as much as the taxpayer,
and also won about twice as many cases as the taxpayer (regardless of who prevailed
in a doctrine's application).
Taxpayers were almost always represented by
lawyers. 107
But these observations do not do justice to the data. Instead, a better narrative is
presented when the data is associated with certain themes. Therefore, the following
discussion is organized around some of the variables used to mine information from
the data about judicial doctrines.

104

Logistic regression permits each independent variable to be isolated ''while controlling
for the influence of other independent variables and while measuring the magnitude of the
int1uence." Schneider, Social Background, supra note 19, at 227.
105

See supra text following note 89 (raising doctrines). Most decisions raised only one
judicial doctrine. Only sixty-eight of the 275 cases raised doctrines multiple times. For
methodological reasons, only the 207 instances in which one court raised one doctrine were
used in the logistic regressions. See infra note 144.
106

See infra app., tbls.A-D (displaying graphs representing much of this data).

107

See supra note 93 (discussing legal representation in tax cases). See also, e.g.,
Schneider, Social Background, supra note 19, at 223 (discussing more prose representation in
other tax litigation).
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B. Who Raised a Doctrine and Did the Party Raising a Doctrine Want the Court to
Apply the Doctrine?
Who raised a judicial doctrine is the first question posed by the data, the answer
to which illuminates flaws in the accepted wisdom. The results reveal that the
taxpayer raised doctrines assertively, rather than passively acting as the party against
whom the government always asserted doctrines. The court, however, was the party
most likely to raise a doctrine. Therefore, what happened when the court acted
influenced other results that flowed from asking which party had raised a doctrine.
The court appears to have raised doctrines because the litigants failed to do so. Even
though a litigant raised a doctrine, presumably for its benefit, its opponent frequently
was the litigant on whose behalf the court then applied that doctrine.
Any participant in litigation-the taxpayer, the government or the court itselfcould raise a doctrine for consideration. When the taxpayer or the government raised
a doctrine (regardless of whether that party also wanted to have the doctrine applied),
it seems reasonable to believe that each of the litigants must have done so to advance
its case, and that the court was prompted by a desire to press a particular point.
As Figure I reveals, it was the court that most frequently raised a doctrine.
Figure 1. Party Raising a Doctrine, by Percentages (N=378)

60 '

court

government

taxpayer

party

The court raised a doctrine almost half the time in all units of analysis, and in the
remaining units, the taxpayer raised a doctrine more than half as frequently as the
government, underscoring the benefit taxpayers saw in raising doctrines. 10 x Figure I
also signals that what courts did about judicial doctrines was critical, given the large
percentage of units of analysis in which it was the court that raised a doctrine.
As noted, 109 the court's predominant role in raising doctrines theoretically might
cloud inferences drawn from the data. Arguably, it might be unrealistic to believe
that the court always raised a doctrine on its own initiative and that the government
and the taxpayer were consistently silent. 110
But the on-line documents

lOR How the parties were served by the court raising doctrines' use is not answered by lig.1,
and therefore must be inferred through results set forth in fig.2, infra.
109

See supra text following note 102.

110

Jd. Even in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 ( 1935), the government said that the
transaction "was without substance and must be disregarded." 293 U.S. 465, 467 ( 1935 ). But
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accompanying the cases from which the units of analysis were derived tend to
suggest that the most likely explanation for the court's activity was that it was acting
in a void created by the litigants.
On--line documents accompanied about half the units of analysis. In about threequarters of the units in which documents appeared, the documents were summary
and most likely only a docket entry. Substantive discussion appeared in forty-six
units of analysis (just over ten percent of all 378 units). Even when litigants' briefs
were reproduced, 111 judicia I doctrines that the court's subsequent opinion discussed
were raised in these briefs in only twelve units, a mere three percent of all units. In
other words, the litigants' briefs inevitably failed to address doctrines subsequently
mentioned in opinions.
What happened in the thirty-plus briefs in which the litigants engaged in
substantive discussion that was not directed towards the judicial doctrines raised in
the court's opinion?
Litigants made focused arguments, relying on specific
authorities such as statutes, cases, regulations and rulings. Because the litigants did
not address judicial doctrines in these briefs, it follows that the court must have been
the party that raised a doctrine.
When who raised a doctrine was contrasted with other aspects about the use of
judicial doctrines, a fuller picture emerges. While the government raised doctrines in
a way resonant with the accepted wisdom-raising them frequently, almost always
seeking to have them applied-taxpayers did not. Taxpayers frequently raised
doctrines, sometimes trying to have them applied, but frequently defensively,
arguing that they should not be applied. The critical player in who raised a doctrine
was the court, \vhich signaled that it intended to act, when rendering its decision, on
the taxpayer's behalf in only a quarter of the units of analysis. 112
Another noteworthy aspect of who raised judicial doctrines was that even
litigants tended to fail to have the doctrines applied by the court in the way they
intended. 113 The taxpayer persuaded the court to apply a doctrine in a way that
benefited it twenty-two percent of the time it raised a doctrine. The government was
more successful-~it persuaded the court to apply a doctrine in a way that benefited it
fifty-one percent of the time it raised a doctrine---but that percentage still does not
reinforce the accepted wisdom about judicial doctrines, since the government lost
with respect to a doctrine's application almost as frequently as it prevailed when it

the court, to judge by the opinion, was the sole source of the conclusion that the transaction
was without "business or corporate purpos~:." ld at 469.
111
0n-line research does not reveal whether the briefs were all or only some of those
submitted during the litigation or how they were chosen tix reproduction. Many of the
documents pertained to discovery, and thus shed no light on legal theories used to advance the
litigants' cases.
112

Thc court, like the government, almost always wanted the doctrines it raised to be
applied. Of all the times the government and the taxpayer raised a doctrine, only once did
either litigant not want a doctrine applied on its own behalf. (The cross-tabulation for this
result was statistically significant.) It seems counterintuitive for a litigant to argue against a
doctrine's application on its behalf, and these two cases may best be understood as aberrant
situations.
113

See also infra fig.2 (displaying results for a party raising doctrine and also wanting the

doctrine applied).
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was the party that raised a doctrine. Again, the litigant that prevailed with respect to
a doctrine's application was strongly influenced by what happened when the court
raised a doctrine. The government prevailed twice as many times as did the taxpayer
in this circumstance, such that, again, an overall bias in favor of the government is
revealed when contrasting who prevailed in a doctrine's application with who raised
a doctrine. 114
Another way in which to adduce information about judicial doctrines in tederal
tax cases is to examine whether a party, having raised a doctrine, wanted the court to
apply the doctrine. It might seem obvious that a party raising a doctrine also wants it
applied, e.g., the government arguing that the substance of a Greg01y-type
distribution was a dividend, despite its technical characterization as a reorganization.
But a party could also argue that application of the doctrine it raised is not
appropriate, as would implicitly occur when a taxpayer argued that it had a business
purpose for its Greg01:v-type distribution. What might be said about a party that
wanted a doctrine it had raised to be applied, or not to be applied?
Generally, the government sought the application of doctrines it raised more than
either of the other parties and the taxpayer sought to avoid application of doctrines
more than either of the other parties. Wanting a judicial doctrine that a party had
raised also to be applied was coupled with the specific doctrine used in the opinion.
Substance over form was used more than any other doctrine when the party that
raised the doctrine also wanted it applied, while business purpose was used more
than other doctrines when the party raising a doctrine did not want it applied.
As Figure 2 reveals, the government and the court rarely raised doctrines without
intending to have them applied. This result conforms to that aspect of the common
wisdom that suggests, as taxpayers structured the form of the transaction, the
government or the court tried to set that form aside. In contrast, the taxpayer raised
doctrines in order to argue their inapplicability (e.g., the aforementioned existence of
a business purpose and, therefore, negation of the business purpose doctrine) more
frequently.

114
These results are statistically significant. When the same questions were asked, but for
units of analysis divided into the three constituent courts in which taxpayers could litigatedistrict courts, the Tax Court, and the Court of Federal Claims, see supra note f\7--the
statistically significant results replicated the above results with some variations. The taxpayer
raised a doctrine somewhat more in the Claims Court than was revealed in figure I, the
government less in that court, but the results in the other two courts were similar to the results
at large. The taxpayer also raised doctrines defensively more in the Claims Court, sixty
percent of the time. While the government continued to avoid using doctrines it had raised
defensively, it did so most in the Claims Court as well, ten percent of the units of analysis in
which it had raised a doctrine. The above results were statistically significant. The only
statistically significant data for the cross-tabulation of which party had raised a doctrine and
which litigant prevailed was for the district courts, where the results tended to replicate those
set forth in the text regarding the entire set of data.
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Figure 2. When Party Raising a Judicial Doctrine Also Wanted the Doctrine
Applied (N=378) 115
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Taxpayers raising doctrines in order to have them applied suggests that taxpayers
perceived that they could use doctrines offensively. Some doctrines cannot be
asserted by the taxpayer; a taxpayer cannot argue that a transaction should be recast
from the original form it chose into a better one because the transaction was a sham,
lacked economic substance or a business purpose. But the other doctrinessubstance over form and the step transaction doctrines-may be asserted by the
taxpayer to recast a transaction as well as the government, because they can be used
to justify a decision on either litigant's behalf.
That taxpayers raised doctrines in order to avoid having them applied also
intimates that taxpayers understood that the government's use of doctrines could be
parried. Even if the taxpayer cannot use the sham transaction, economic substance
or business purpose doctrines offensively, it still can use them defensively, raising
these doctrines in order to argue that they should not be applied. The results reveal
the taxpayer understood its ability to use the doctrine that cut both ways, substance
over form, offensively, and the defensive use of the business purpose doctrine. 116
Use of the remaining doctrines, however, does not reinforce this perception. Each of
the remaining three doctrines-sham, economic substance, and step transactionwere raised by a party only to have the party argue that they were inapplicable
roughly fifteen percent of the time. Therefore, there is no ready explanation why
doctrines were raised only to then be avoided. 117

1 15

These results are statistically significant.

1 16
The doctrine raised most frequently by a party arguing that the doctrine's application
was not appropriate was the business purpose doctrine; that p~uty called for not applying the
business purpose doctrine thirty-seven percent of the time the doctrine was raised. In contrast,
the doctrine raised most frequently by a party seeking to have the doctrine applied was
substance over form; that party argued not to apply that doctrine only five percent of the time.
These results were for all parties that raised doctrines and then argued tor or against the
doctrines, not for whether the taxpayer, government or cou1t had raised doctrines and then
argued that they did not apply, because those results were not statistically significant.

17

1
The party raising other doctrines and arguing that it should not be applied did so twenty
percent of the time tor the economic substance doctrine, nineteen percent of the time for the
step transaction doctrine, and thirteen percent of the time for the sham transaction doctrine.
These results are statistically significant. While the finer question of which party raised a
particular doctrine and sought to not have the doctrine applied did not lead to statistically
significant results, one might infer, given the large number of times that the taxpayer assumed
this posture, that this was most frequently the taxpayer.

When the results were examined tor each of the courts, modest changes occurred. The
taxpayer sought to avoid application of doctrines it had raised somewhat less in the district
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C. Judicial Doctrines Used

A second way to assess how parties relied on judicial doctrines is to examine
which doctrines the parties raised. The specific doctrines used are cross-tabulated
against the parties that raised the doctrines in Figure 3. The extent to which the
government, the court and the taxpayer used each judicial doctrine is set forth in this
figure so that, for example, one may see that the court used substance over t()rm in
about sixty percent of all units of analysis in which it raised a doctrine (and the
government and the taxpayer about twenty and thirty percent, respectively) by
looking at the bars at the extreme right side of the figure.

Figure 3. Doctrine Used and Party Raising a Doctrine
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One of the more striking results set forth in Figure 3 is the heavy reliance on
substance over form. As one looks at the set of columns on the far right of the
figure, it is apparent that a large percent of the doctrines used in the court's opinion,
regardless of which party raised a doctrine, was substance over form. Indeed,
substance over form failed as the preeminent doctrine only when the party raising the
doctrine was the government. 119
One way in which to interpret this use of substance over form is that every party,
especially the court, recognizes the flexibility that this doctrine presents. Other
doctrines require more specific findings: the absence of a specific purpose. for the
business purpose and sham transaction doctrines: or facts, f()r the economic
substance or step transaction doctrines. While substance over form is. of course.
factually grounded. it alone among judicial doctrines lacks relatively objective
standards. 120
The court's predominate use of substance over form- -almost two-thirds of the
time-resonates with the court as the party most likely to raise a doctrine. As noted,
court and the Tax Court than it had when all the courts were aggregated; the government and
the court sought to have doctrines they raised applied even more in these two courts. In
contrast, the taxpayer sought to avoid application of doctrines it raised even more in the Court
of Federal Claims, while the government and court somewhat less. These results are
statistically significant in all three courts.
118

These results are statistically significant.

11

qThe frequency of the doctrines used in all units of analysis, f(lr all parties and not just
for each, is set forth inji·a app., thl. E. Suhstance over form was used the most and the step
transaction doctrine the least.
120

See supra Part II.C.
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there is some evidence that litigants' arguments gravitate towards certainty: cases,
regulations, legislative history, etc., instead of judicial doctrines. 121 If use of
doctrines rests primarily with the court, then the court might also prefer substance
over form, the doctrine least constrained by ascertainable standards, in order to
maximize its flexibility when applying doctrines and deciding cases. The taxpayer
also benefits from uncertainty, as it struggles to escape the form of the transaction it
crafted and so it, too, can therefore benefit by using form over substance. In
comparison, the government-motivated by its desire to compel the taxpayer to
submit to the form of the transaction it originally chose-has less reason to use
substance over form.
Another revealing aspect of the doctrines used was that the government relied
less on any one doctrine than the court or the taxpayer. This outcome might reflect
the government's conformance, again, to the common wisdom-raise doctrines in
order to have them applied-in contrast to the court and the taxpayer, who appear to
have raised doctrines, respectively, because the litigants tended not to do so or in
negation of that wisdom. The taxpayer also prevailed most in a doctrine's
application when that doctrine was the business purpose doctrine. 122 This result
fortifies the earlier observation that the taxpayer raised the business purpose doctrine
more, only to argue that it was not applicable. Figure 3 reveals that the taxpayer had
great success maintaining this position, raising and then distinguishing the business
purpose doctrine from the case at issue. The government prevailed most in a
doctrine's application when that doctrine was substance over form. Substance over
form's benefiting the government may be explained by the court's heavy reliance on
that doctrine compounded with the court's primary role in raising doctrines and its
favoring the government when it did raise doctrines. 123 While one might argue that
different areas of tax law favored different doctrines--e.g., the sham transaction
doctrine was used more in alter ego-nominee cases than other doctrines 124-that
point of view cannot explain why the various parties raised doctrines differently.
Each party had equal access to each area---the taxpayer could have sought to
distinguish the sham doctrine in an alleged alter ego case as easily as the court or the
government could have raised it-so something else must have prompted the
variance.
When questions surrounding the doctrines used were examined in each of the
three courts under observation, the results replicated the more general findings,
although the results also lacked statistical significance. The parties raising the
doctrines had statistical significance in the Tax Court and the district court, but not in
the Court of Federal Claims, and the litigant that prevailed was statistically
significant only in the district court.
D. Areas ofLaw

One of the more intriguing aspects about the data assembled for this article is the
chance to confirm that judicial doctrines appear in specific areas of tax law, as the
121

122
12

See supra text following note Ill.
Fifty-nine percent in statistically significant results.

'Sixty-nine percent in statistically significant results. See supra fig.2.

124

See infra notes 129-30.
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literature suggests, such as corporate tax, estate planning, and matters surrounding
families. This connection between doctrines and different areas of tax is one of the
few "hard" observations about judicial tax doctrines in the literature and, other than
authors' impressions that such associations exist, no evidence exists to prove or
disprove this assertion. 12 ' While the data suggest that doctrines appear more in
certain areas, no evidence buttresses the alleged connection between doctrines and
areas of Jaw. To some extent, this gap may exist because contrasting the literature
and the data is an inexact process. The observation is dated, the evidence is not, and
data-including the areas of law in which tax controversies occur-~may have
changed over time; one conclusion is impressionistic and the other empirical; and the
two sets of results have been measured by different areas oflaw.
Having noted these warnings, the data set forth in Figure 4 reveal that judicial
doctrines arose a greater number of times in two areas of Jaw-what is deductible
and procedural and criminal tax matters~than in business tax (which combines
corporate and partnership tax). 126 Indeed, the first two categories accounted for half
of all the times that doctrines were raised (roughly twenty-five percent in each),
while only ten percent of all the cases in which doctrines were used involved
business tax. After business tax, the next area in which doctrines were most
frequently raised involved employment tax, followed by estate planning (which
combined estate and gi t1 tax cases ). 127
Figure 4. Areas of Tax Law Raised in Units of Analysis by Percentage
(N=378)
30
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Even more compelling than whether doctrines could be linked to areas of tax law
is which doctrines were used in which areas. 12 x Substance over form was used the
greatest percentage of times in cases involving accounting and capital assets (relative
to substance over form's use in other areas) and least in cases involving business tax
or the proper rate of tax. In contrast, the step transaction doctrine was used the

125

See supra note 36.

126

These results are statistically significant.

127 See supra text accompanying note 9X (discussing areas of tax law categorized for this
article).
12

~These results are statistically significant.
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greatest percentage of times in cases concerning the rate of tax and least in those
about accounting (relative to the doctrine's use in other areas of law). The sham
transaction doctrine was used the greatest percentage of times in procedural and
criminal tax cases, economic substance in cases about deductions, and business
purpose in cases involving accounting, estate planning and capital assets.
It is difficult to assess the meaning of the results between judicial doctrines and
areas of law because there is no benchmark for comparison other than, of course, the
outgrown judgments about the areas in which any doctrine appears. At the very
least, however, the view about doctrines' use is outdated, and must be revised to
retlect doctnnes' actual prevalence in various areas. Furthermore, certain doctrines
may be associated with certain areas because of how case law has developed. For
example, economic substance may simply be the doctrine used most to disallow
deductions if and when those deductions have no basis for existing other than to
reduce somcone's tax. 129 Similarly, the sham transaction doctrine was used in alter
ego-nominee tax cases, which were characterized as involving procedural tax
matters: that may account for the preeminence of this doctrine in cases about
procedural and criminal tax matters. Another possible explanation is that doctrine
use is shaped by necessity, with the litigants and the court (the party that primarily
raised doctrines 1111 ) doing whatever was necessary to win or to manage litigation.
E. The One- Wm·
Street

Rule

Another untested perception about judicial doctrines is that they lie on a one-way
street, raised by the government or court, but allowed to the taxpayer only when it
can establish ti·aud or duress in its choosing the original form of the transaction. 131
Evidence gleaned fl·om the database suggests that this truism is incorrect, because the
one-way street rule was not frequently invoked, either in substance or by citing the
cases usually associated with the rule.
The taxpayer raised doctrines in seventy-four units of analysis. Even if the need
f(Jr fraud or duress could have been invoked only in the cases in which the taxpayer
sought to apply a doctrine- -which it did for1y-one times of these seventy-four
instances- the one-way street rule was raised in only thirteen of these cases, less
the forty-one cases in which it could and should have been raised. 132
than a third
Because the rule must be invoked absolutely, the only way in which to explain the
failure to invoke the rule in the other two-thirds of the authority is that the rule was
ignored.

or

"''See supra Part II.C.4.
1 11
' See
131

'"I'm tig.l.

Sec supra Part II. E.

1

''When raised, the rule was applied eleven limes to preclude the taxpayer's altering the
form of the transaction.
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F. Assessing Cause and £/feet in the Database
Regressions permit the association of independent and dependent variables. 133
More than merely describing what happened, they permit one to inter what might
occur-to predict the likely outcome of events caused by certain factors in a
database. Logistic regressions offer the benefit of isolating the effect of each
independent variable while controlling for the influence of other independent
variables, and simultaneously measuring the magnitude of the variables' influence.
In other words, these regressions are able to tell us what matters and what matters
most.
An illustrative logistic regression for the database created for this Article is set
forth in the Appendix. 114 The independent variables used in the logistic regression m
were:
•

whether the party that had raised a doctrine wanted the doctrine
applied;

•

which party raised the doctrine 136 :

133

See KNOKE ET AL.. supm note I03. at 235. Predictive statistics permit drawing
inferences between causes and effects within a database. such as whether the party that raised
a doctrine or the taxpayer's representation by a lawyer could be associated with the taxpayer
prevailing in a particular doctrine's application.
134

See app .. thi.F.

135

The independent variables that have more than two categories-tor example. the party
that had raised a doctrine could have been the government. the taxpayer. or the court-had to
he parsed into two categories by using '"dummy" variables in order to test the etTect of each
possible scenario (i.e .. government versus non-government (taxpayer and court), taxpayer
versus non-taxpayer, court versus non-court, court versus non-court (government and
taxpayer)) in the logistic regression. See KNOKE 1::1 AL., supra note I 03, at 271-78. The
variables for the type of taxpayer and the doctrine used in the court's opinion also have
multiple categories, and so they were rendered into (dichotomous) dummy variables as well.
136
See supra text accompanying notes 95-99 (discussing these variables). It is important to
ascertain the multicollinearity of the independent variables. Multicollinearity occurs when
there is a high correlation between independent variables and it may lead to a less accurate
prediction of the outcome. See KNOKE ET AL., supra note 103, at 268. Some of the
independent variables led to higher correlations. These include:

*when the type of taxpayer was a business or an individual-a correlation of .820;

* when the party raising the doctrine was the court and either the taxpayer or the
government-.585 and .641, respectively:
* when the party raising the doctrine was the taxpayer or the government and on whose
behalf the party that had raised the doctrine wanted the court to act-.604 and .4R5,
respectively; and
* when the doctrine used was substance over 1orm and either economic substance or the
sham transaction doctrine- .534 and .450. respectively.
What constitutes multicollinearity is unclear, Schneider, Social Background, supra note
19, at 229 n.73, hut in the past l have used a benchmark of +/-.500. id. KNOKE ET AL., supra
note 103. at 268, and suggest that +/-.800 reveals high multicollinearity. For the reasons just
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•

whether the taxpayer was represented by a lawyer;

•

the taxpayer's legal status 137 :

•

in whose behalf did the party that raised the doctrine want the court to
act; and

•

which doctrine did the court apply (or not apply) in rendering its
deci:,ion. us
139

The dependent variable was which party prevailed in a doctrine's application.
140
The results were not robust, so limited conclusions may be drawn from them.
To the extent that the results were statistically significant, they appeared to cluster in
one of two ways.
First, some could be characterized as being connected to the
assertiveness with which parties postured for doctrines' applications. For example, a
statistically significant result occurred between the party that raised a doctrine and
the litigant that prevailed in a doctrine's application. The government or the
noted and the minimization, the highest correlation of the independent variables used was
.325.
Eliminating just one of the dichotomous variables for which party had raised a doctrine
would have sufficed for purposes of creating a dummy variable. Except when the party
raising a doctrine was the taxpayer (versus not the taxpayer such as the court or the
government), high con·elations were generated against two other independent variables-the
government (versus not the government) and the litigant on whose behalf the party that raised
the doctrine wanted the court to act. So both types of parties who raised doctrines (the
taxpayer and the government) were both eliminated in order to avoid multicollinearity.
117

When the type of taxpayer was a business (versus not a business) the independent
variable was eliminated because it occurred less frequently than the independent variable
when the type of taxpayer was an individual (versus not an individual). This elimination also
satisfied the need 1(Jr a dummy variable. See infi·a app., tbl.B.
110

While substance over form was used more than other doctrines, eliminating it from the
independent variables most easily eliminated higher correlations and also satisfied the need for
a dummy variable.
139

Who won the case also could have been used as the dependent variable, but the article
examines judicial doctrines and so using who prevailed instead of who won seemed more
appropriate. On the other hand, parties that prevailed in a doctrine's application also tended,
in a statistically significant manner, to win cases, so the results may not have been that
different had the other dependent variable been used.
110

R.egrcssions may be relined by testing for interactions among the independent variables.
One tests for interactions by looking for associations between variables when controlling for
other variables. A simple example might be to assume in a particular election that younger
women of a particular racial group vote for Candidate B. Is it the voters' age, race, or possibly
ge<Jgraphic !oration that influence the outcome'1 Testing for interactions, therefore, may help
in understanding the e1lcct of independent variables on the outcome.
Here, the outcome of the government or the taxpayer prevailing could have been caused
by several independent variables, and so testing for interactions enables one to suggest which
of thc<;c factors was influential. Unfortunately, the interactions were not robust and so they
are not discussed.
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taxpayer's raising a doctrine was associated with the taxpayer's prevailing in the
doctrine's application, and the court's raising a doctrine with the government
prevailing. Therefore, the taxpayer's raising a doctrine worked on its behalt~ while
the government's raising a doctrine did not. An even more focused result occurred
when asking on which litigant's behalf a doctrine had been raised, because that
outcome could be associated with that litigant prevailing in the doctrine's use. A
party raising a doctrine and asking the court to act on the government's behalf was
predictive of the government prevailing with respect to that doctrine. Conversely,
the party asking the court to apply the doctrine on behalf of the taxpayer also was
predictive of the taxpayer prevailing. The government or the taxpayer rarely asked
the court to apply a doctrine in favor of its opponent, so the litigants' asserting
doctrines on their own behalf was connected with their prevailing in having those
doctrines applied. 141 The key player, however, remained the court.
The other statistically significant associations in the regression were among the
doctrines used. Use of the business purpose and the sham transaction doctrines were
associated with the taxpayer's prevailing with respect to these doctrines'
applications. Because these doctrines could not be applied on the taxpayer's
behalf: 142 either the taxpayer must have raised them but argued their inapplicability,
or the government must have argued unsuccessfully for their application. In
contrast, use of the step transaction doctrine was associated with the government's
prevailing in the doctrine's use. 143
What do these two sets of results mean? Conclusions drawn from the latter set~
the doctrines used-seem more apparent. One distinction between the doctrines that
favored the taxpayer~business purpose and sham-and the one that benefited the
government~step transaction~is that the first two can be applied only on behalf of
the government. Arguably, the all or nothing approach demanded of these doctrines
could have led to these associations that favored the taxpayer. One may also inter
that the evidence offered to support these doctrines favored the taxpayer, given the
taxpayer's success with them. The association of the step transaction doctrine with
the government prevailing in the doctrine's use is more enigmatic. It could be
argued that the other doctrine that could be applied to justify a decision on either
litigants' behalf--substance over form~led to results that were too dispersed
between the taxpayer and the government for a pattern to appear. Why, then, did
only one of these two have results that even approached statistical significance?
The meaning of the other results-those associated with the assertiveness with
which they were argued~is less clear. To a limited extent, they sustain the truism
that judicial doctrines are applied to benefit the government. The court raised
doctrines more than the government and the taxpayer and the greater frequency with
141

Seesupra note 112.

142

See supra text following note l 15.

143
Furthermore, the association of this doctrine with the government's prevailing in the
doctrine's use only approached statistical significance.

Another set of logistic regressions, the independent variables of which were identical to
those used in the Appendix but tor the exclusion of economic substance and inclusion of
substance over form. The results were similar to those discussed in the text regarding the
regression in the Appendix, although use of the sham transaction doctrine became statistically
significant.
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which the government instead of the taxpayer prevailed in a doctrine's application
can be associated with the court's frequency in raising doctrines. But the taxpayer's
raising a doctrine was connected to its prevailing in a doctrine's application and to
this extent the common wisdom rings falsely. Litigants inevitably raised doctrines
for their own benefit, and so the association of the government's raising doctrines
with the taxpayer prevailing may suggest that the government chose its cases poorly.
Inevitably, however, there is something contradictory about the results. Litigant's
raising doctrines was associated with the taxpayer prevailing, yet a party's raising a
doctrine and asking the court to apply it on behalf of a litigant was associated with
that litigant's prevailing.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article begins with the premise that there is a common wisdom, one
promoted by traditional literature, that judicial tax doctrines are inevitably invoked
by the government or the court for the benefit of the government. The taxpayer
profits from formal compliance with the terms of a statute, and so the common
wisdom seems reasonable. This Article hypothesizes, however, that the common
wisdom is wrong and that judicial doctrines are not used exclusively for the benefit
of the government. Instead, the landscape drawn by the database created for this
article suggests that judicial doctrines are asserted vigorously, by taxpayers as well
as the government and courts. More than the other two parties, taxpayers raised
doctrines and argued that they not be applied. Doctrines were applied more for the
benefit of the government than the taxpayer, but were, it should be underscored,
applied on behalf of the taxpayer. Substance over form was the judicial doctrine
used most often, and specific doctrines appeared more in certain areas of substantive
law. The theoretical importance of the one-way rule notwithstanding, it did not seem
to be raised much. And, finally, various causes led to one litigant or the other
prevailing in a doctrine's use. A litigant was more likely to prevail if the party
raising a doctrine wanted it applied on that party's behalf. The taxpayer's prevailing
in a doctrine's application was associated with the taxpayer or the court raising a
doctrine and the government's prevailing was associated with the court raising a
doctrine. Furthermore, use of the business purpose and sham transaction doctrines
were associated with the taxpayer prevailing in those doctrines' use and the step
transaction doctrine with the government's prevailing in that doctrine's use.
More empirical research must be done about judicial doctrines in tax, to fill the
gap between what is thought and what in fact occurs. Doing so can lead to a greater
understanding of how these doctrines are used and which litigant they benefit.
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APPENDIX A

Table A Frequency of units of analysis in different courts (N=378)
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Table 8 Frequency of Appearance of Different Types of Taxpayers (N=378)
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Table C Frequency of Litigants Winning Cases (N=378)
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Table 0 Frequency of Litigants Prevailing in Application of Doctrines (N=378)
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Table E Frequency of Doctrines Used (N=378)
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Table F. Logistic Regression Between Various Independent Variables and Who
Prevailed in a Doctrine's Use (N=207)

Did the party that raised a doctrine
also want the doctrine applied
(O=no, !=yes)
Party raising doctrine
(O=government or taxpayer,
[=court)
Taxpayer had lawyer (O=no lawyer,
!=lawyer)
Type of taxpayer (O=business,
individual, I =trust/estate/nonprofit
or government)
Type of taxpayer (O=business,
trust/estate/ nonprofit or
government, I =individual)
On whose behalf did party that
raised doctrine want court to act
(O=taxpayer, I =court)
Doctrine used (O=economic
substance, sham, step transaction,
substance over form, 1=business
purpose)
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S.E.

Signiiicance

Exp.

.942

.622

.130

2.565

-

.426

.003

.287

.638

.155

.404

.513

.717

.474

1.670

-

.394

.879

.942

2.175

.395

.000

8.798

-

.847

.009

.109

1.248

-

.906

.060

2.218
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Doctrine used (O=business purpose,
sham, step transaction, substance
over form, I =economic substance)

Doctrine used (O=business purpose,
economic substance, sham,
substance over form, 1=sham)
Doctrine used (O=business purpose,
economic substance, sham, step
transaction, 1=step transaction)

.513

.557

.357

1.671

-

.594

.024

.261

1.151

.077

7.640

1.345
2.033

144

144

The column titled "significance" sets forth the statistical significance of the relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. For a discussion of statistical
significance, see supra note I 03.
The columns for ~ and Exp. (~) state the same fact differently. ~ indicates the effect of an
independent variable on the logarithmic probability of the dependent variable occurring. If the
Exp. (~) is greater than one, the presence of the independent variable----for example, the party
wanting the doctrine applied-means that the dependent variable is more likely to occur than
not. If the result for this independent variable is statistically significant, that makes the
association more meaningful. See supra note I 03 (discussing statistical significance). If the
Exp. (~)is less than one, the presence of the independent variable-for example, the use of the
business purpose doctrine as opposed to all other judicial doctrines-means that the dependent
variable is less likely to occur than not (and, again, this result is enhanced by its statistical
significance). Exp. (~)can also be said to state the odds ratio. See KNOKE ET AL., supra note
103, at 161-63, 309-11 (discussing odds and odds ratios). For example, when the type of
taxpayer to whom a doctrine was applied was a trust or an estate, the odds ratio of the
government's prevailing in a doctrine's use increased about 1.7 times. And when the party
raising a doctrine also wanted the doctrine applied, because that Exp. (~) is greater, about 2.6,
then it could be said that the latter variable increased the odds ratio of the doctrine being
applied in the government's behalf even more and would therefore be even more powerfully
associated with the government prevailing than the former independent variable.
Unfortunately, neither Exp. (~) is statistically significant. Therefore these two results are less
meaningful.
Understanding how the variables are coded is part of the process of reading these
regressions. Positive and negative effects (relative to one) connote direction, but only by
reference to how the variables are coded. To continue with the first illustration in the prior
paragraph, the Exp. (~)of 1.7 is predictive of two results. First, the government will prevail
when the taxpayer in the unit of analysis is a trust or estate, and not an individual or a business
because that independent variable-the characterization of the taxpayer-is coded O=taxpayer
who is business or individual, I =taxpayer who is trust or estate, and the dependent variable is
coded O=taxpayer prevailing in a doctrine's use, !=government prevailing in a doctrine's use.
Second, the government prevails when the taxpayer is a trust or estate, because of the same
coding.
The Exp. ~ of .I 09 with respect to use of the business purpose doctrine is predictive of two
results as well: Using the business purpose doctrine is predictive of the taxpayer's prevailing
in a doctrine's use because of the coding (independent variable, O=doctrine used is one other
than business purpose, I =doctrine used is business purpose, and dependent variable,
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Table G Frequencies oflndependent Variables in Table E (N='J07) 145
Independent
variables/frequencies
No-ll%
Yes- 89%
Did the party that raised a
doctrine also want the
doctrine applied
Party raising doctrine
Government or taxpayer Court- 60%
-40%
No-12%
Taxpayer had lawyer
Yes- 88%
Type of taxpayer:
Not a trust or estate - Trust or estate- 9%
91%
Not an individual- 47%
Individual -53%
On whose behalf did party
Taxpayer- 38%
Government- 62%
that raised doctrine want
court to act
Not business purpose - Business purpose - 6%
Doctrine used:
94%
Not economic substance Economic substance
-85%
15%
Sham-JI%
Not a sham- 89%
Step transaction- 6%
Not step transaction 94%
Taxpayer prevailed - Government prevailed Dependent variable73%
taxpayer prevailed in
28%
doctrine's use/government
prevailed
~

--

O=taxpayer prevailing in a doctrine's use, I =government prevailing in a doctrine's use). Also,
not using the business purpose doctrine is predictive of the government prevailing in the
doctrine's usc, again because of the same coding.

The N is smaller in the logistic regressions than in the descriptive statistics due to use of
units of analysis in which a court used multiple doctrines, supra note I 05. Otherwise the risk
occurs that the sampling would not be representative.
145 Tbi.G

sets forth the frequencies with which the independent variables and the
/dependent variable appeared in tbi.F.
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